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Providing substantial amounts (particularly over 20 hours a week) of care to a disabled or elderly relative 
or friend is associated with reduced labour market participation, poverty and adverse psychological and 
physical health. Many countries have introduced “cash for care” measures. Sometimes their primary 
objective is to provide financial support for the older or disabled person to help meet the additional costs 
of needing care. In other instances “cash for care” aims at offering consumer-style choice to older and 
disabled people. In such instances, benefitting carers, if at all, is a secondary aim. Moreover, these 
measures differ widely in terms of target group, eligibility criteria, interactions with formal care services, 
payment levels and whether they are means-tested. Their impact on carers also varies, depending on 
local labour markets, the availability of formal long-term care services, and, critically important, social 
attitudes towards the roles of families (and women within families) in caring for older and disabled 
people. This article provides a critical overview of the main models. 
Personal budgets or consumer-directed employment of carers 
Instead of receiving services, an older or disabled person can choose to receive a personal budget of an 
equivalent value to purchase care themselves, either from an agency or by directly employing a carer. 
There is increasing interest in consumer-directed cash-for-care schemes as a means of increasing 
choice and flexibility in long-term care; such schemes exist in the U.K., the Netherlands, some U.S. 
States and the Flanders region of Belgium. In the Netherlands and the Flanders (and to some extent in 
the U.K.) the personal budget recipient can employ a close relative. The relationship between care 
receiver and carer thus becomes one of employer-employee. In the Netherlands, employment above a 
minimum number of hours per week is regulated by a formal contract setting out the carer’s terms and 
conditions of employment. Personal budget schemes in England and many U.S. States involve 
intermediary agencies to manage payroll, taxes, recruitment and training.1 Older people are more likely 
than younger disabled people to employ relatives as their service providers.2 
The level of a personal budget is usually calculated by multiplying the number of hours of care needed 
against an hourly rate (at least the legal minimum wage), thus in principle offering appropriate economic 
rewards for care. However, carers employed in this way report increased feelings of obligation and 
difficulties in negotiating time off.3 Consequently the total value of the care provided usually far exceeds 
the payment received. 
The reliability of the carer’s income depends on continuing good relationships between employer and 
employee. Carers are also financially vulnerable if the older or disabled person dies or enters hospital or 
long-term care. Personal budgets may attract new family members, such as newly retired relatives, into 
care work. However, carers employed by personal budget-holders occupy a marginal position between 
the formal and informal care workforces; formal training or career advancement schemes are very rare. 
Carers who have spent periods employed by a personal budget holder may find themselves 
                                                 
1
  OECD (2005). 
2
  Wiener et al. (2003). 
3
  Breda et al. (2006). 
Health and Ageing
Research Programme on Health and Productive Ageing
21
Cash for Care: Implications for Carers 
by  Caroline Glendinning 
This article was published in the Health and Ageing Newsletter No. 21, October 2009 
The Geneva Association                                          Health and Ageing N° 21 /October 2009  
 
 2
disadvantaged when they try to re-enter the formal labour market. Carers employed by personal budget 
holders may also find they are unable to access any formal care services to support or relieve them in 
their role. 
Employing family carers through a personal budget is not universally popular. In the Netherlands, only 
about ten per cent of all those receiving social insurance-funded long-term care choose to receive this in 
the form of a personal budget. In 2007 one-third of budget holders relied only on care provided by 
relatives, one-third only on care provided by care organisations and one-third on a combination of the 
two.4 
Care or attendance allowances paid to the older or disabled person 
Here the cash payment is made to the disabled or older person, sometimes with no formal requirement 
as to how it should be used. However, in many instances it is expected that the allowance will be given 
to or used by a family carer. 
Care or attendance allowances are paid in Germany, Austria and France. In Germany, someone eligible 
for long-term care insurance can choose between service “assignments” up to a specified value or a 
lower, non-taxable cash benefit (or a combination of the two). The cash benefit option has always been 
more popular because beneficiaries prefer family care to formal services from strangers. However there 
is no obligation on the recipient to give the cash benefit to the carer; there is evidence that it is not 
always transferred in full;5 and in other households it may simply be added to the joint household income 
rather than constituting an independent income for the carer. 
In Austria, lower income care allowance recipients are likely to use the benefit to support family carers; 
professional families are more likely to use it to employ live-in carers through the “grey” labour market. In 
both instances, the low level of the allowance institutionalises care-giving as women’s work.6 
Care allowances have many of the drawbacks of personal budgets. Carers are likely to find themselves 
financially dependent on the person they are caring for. Lundsgaard7 also argues that such payments 
can create an incentive “trap”, attracting informal carers away from the formal labour market if 
interactions between care allowances, taxes, unemployment benefits and other income transfers are not 
well controlled. 
On the other hand, it is possible to add measures specifically intended to benefit informal carers to a 
care allowance (although again these can only be accessed if the care recipient qualifies for the care 
allowance). In Germany, informal carers of care allowance recipients are entitled to four weeks’ break 
each year (with care insurance paying the costs of respite care). Their pension and accident insurance 
contributions are also paid if they are not in full-time paid work and providing 14-plus hours care per 
week. Recent German reforms have increased funding for voluntary sector respite care centres, reduced 
the threshold so that respite care can be received after six months instead of a year, and introduced 
training courses for carers and retraining courses for carers wishing to return to paid work. 
It is in principle possible in both Austria and Germany for care allowance recipients to also use some 
formal services, which helps to relieve the burdens on carers. However, in Austria continuing shortages 
and high costs of formal services make extensive reliance on informal care inevitable.8 
Care allowances paid directly to carers to replace lost earnings 
The U.K., Ireland and Australia all offer benefits as part of their national social security systems to 
replace the earnings lost by working age carers who have no, or only minimal earnings, because of their 
care responsibilities. Here, care-giving is treated as a labour market-related risk similar to unemployment 
or sickness; carers are assumed to be members of the labour market and have entitlement to an income 
in their own right. However, the level of the payment is usually very low and eligibility often depends on a 
strict test of carers’ means and assets; it therefore offers only minimal social protection. Where such 
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allowances also attract payment of carers’ State pension contributions, some longer-term protection may 
be provided as well. 
 
This income maintenance model is not compatible with carers’ continuing labour market participation; 
eligibility criteria assume the carer has no paid work and probably no other source of income either. On 
the other hand, it does not preclude either carers or the people they support from also receiving services. 
A variation of this approach, in Sweden and Canada, is to provide carers with income during temporary 
absence from work, along with rights to return to the same job. This measure is targeted at carers of 
terminally ill people, but is not effective for longer-term care commitments. 
Paying carers instead of formal social service provision 
Here, care-giving is formalised within a quasi-employment relationship, but with the local authority as the 
employer rather than the care recipient (as in the personal budget model). This model operates in a 
number of Scandinavian countries.9 It reflects the high levels of female labour market participation in 
these countries, their continuing relatively high levels of publicly-funded services, and the challenges of 
delivering formal social services in sparsely populated rural areas. 
In Finland, for example, the Informal Carer’s Allowance is awarded on the basis of an older person’s 
care needs but is paid directly to the carer, who contracts with the municipality to provide an agreed level 
of care according to a care plan. The majority of carers employed in this way are spouses or other close 
relatives and a third are aged 65 and over.10 Levels of Informal Carer’s Allowances are lower than the 
value of formal home care services; they offer no incentive to continue caring, but are believed to 
encourage carers to continue their existing care-giving responsibilities. 
Carers employed by Finnish municipalities are entitled to three free days a month during a period when 
the nature of the care they have provided has been demanding. The municipality is responsible for 
providing substitute care, usually in a nursing home, but there is a serious lack of personalised and 
suitable substitute care options. Some municipalities have developed alternative schemes whereby 
another relative or friend is paid by the municipality to provide “substitute” care in the older person’s 
home to give the main Carer Allowance recipient a break. 
Paying carers in recognition of their care-giving responsibilities 
There are a few examples of payments to carers simply in recognition of their care-giving work. 
In the Netherlands an annual “Carer Compliment” payment was introduced in 2007. All carers supporting 
people eligible for long-term care insurance benefits can receive the Carer Compliment, which is worth 
€250 (tax-free). However, in its first year only ten per cent of those expected to be eligible applied; this 
was believed to be partly due to the lengthy and bureaucratic application process. Eligibility criteria have 
therefore been relaxed somewhat; it is now estimated that 266,332 carers might receive the Compliment, 
although its value may be reduced slightly.11 
The Australian Carer Allowance is an income supplement paid simply in recognition of the carer’s role 
and to help with the extra costs associated with care-giving. It is paid directly to carers who provide full-
time daily care for a disabled adult, older person or child and can be claimed for each person who is 
cared for. It is a universal, non-taxable benefit, and is not dependent on the carer’s income or assets, or 
whether or not they have paid work. There is therefore no loss of benefit and potential disincentive for 
carers who remain in, or move into, paid work. 
Conclusions 
The various cash-for-care models have different implications for carers’ ability to undertake other, 
remunerative, work, and for their ability to access formal services that substitute for family care and 
therefore provide a break from care-giving. Most restrictive in both respects are cash-for-care models 
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that assume informal care-giving to be a full-time role that is therefore incompatible with mainstream 
labour market participation and is also assumed to substitute for formal care services. 
 
All the cash-for-care models offer low levels of financial reward in comparison to the actual level of care 
provided. Even where hourly payment rates are at or above the legal minimum wage, the total volume of 
care provided usually far exceeds the hours that are actually paid for. Income replacement benefits for 
carers wholly unable to work are typically means-tested as well as paid at very low levels. Low levels of 
payments for informal care reinforce existing gender inequalities and have little potential to alter the 
gender distribution of care work. “An unequal distribution of caring work contributes to income inequality, 
inequalities in retirement incomes and in participation in social life.”12 
 
Cash-for-care models also do little to bridge the boundaries between informal care and formal labour 
market participation, for example by explicitly encouraging carers to retain contact with the labour market 
while caring. There is also little evidence of measures to formalise the skills acquired in informal care-
giving as potential assets for future employment,13 even where carers have previously been employed by 
care recipients holding a personal budget, although a scheme along these lines has recently been 
introduced in Spain. Some workplace-based measures do offer carers leave for an extended period with 
their jobs protected, but long-term paid leave is unusual. 
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